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Abstract

This thesis explores the growth of polarization in American politics and society as a result of
social homophily. In recent years, social scientists have documented the increase in polarization,
but their work has tended to view party identification and ideological rigidity as something to be
explained in the context of policy battles and not as an independent variable that drives other
areas of political and social life. My main thesis in this project is that social self-segregation has
turned partisanship into a larger part of a person’s identity—in other words, people are not
partisan because of deeply held views on issues but rather because partisanship and ideological
rigidity are the primary determining factors of their broader worldview. People therefore
“choose” to be ideologically rigid or partisan and allow this to predetermine many of their views
on social issues.
Keywords: social homophily, echo chamber effect, polarization

THE SEVENTH PARTY SYSTEM?

3
Introduction

When Donald Trump won the United States presidency in 2016 even after breaking every
rule in the electoral playbook, political scientists knew at once they had a long road ahead in
making sense of the campaign. Prevailing research up until this point had drawn conclusions
based on the assumption that voters choose candidates based on their policy positions.
Throughout the campaign, though, leading all the way up to the election, it became clear that the
candidates’ coalitions were polarized on solid party lines that appeared to transcend policy. A
quick look at Donald Trump’s positions on trade, entitlements, and infrastructure showed
significant divergence from traditional Republican economic bedrock, and even his support for
pro-life positions and other religious values was lukewarm at best (Krauthammer, 2016). Hillary
Clinton, likewise, ran in her party’s middle and offered little in the way of new policy solutions,
but her voters clung to her, viewing the election as an existential struggle every bit as much
about defeating Trump as it was about electing another progressive to carry on President
Obama’s legacy (Klein, 2016). Consequently, the American people made a rapid shift from
supporting candidates on ideology to instead voting on persona, media image, and party lines.
Moving forward, this leaves political scientists with a whole new line of research to sort through
and raises new questions about what partisanship means to American voters. The following study
is offered as a first step toward solving this riddle.
The Question
This thesis is an initial foray into a broader and timely study of the relationship between
partisanship and identity. It will attempt to answer the question, “Do social homophily and the
echo chamber effect polarize politics to the extent that they cause voters on the extreme end of
either party to view each other as existential threats?” A critical assumption this thesis makes is
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that partisanship is less the exclusive result of ideological values and that party affiliation and
ideology are both part of an identity spectrum that defines how American voters relate to each
other and to their system of government. This study will examine the political scene in the
context of recent trends which both indicate that the two major parties (the Republican Party
especially) are moving further apart to the fringes of the political spectrum and that voters
remained committed to their parties’ candidates in the 2016 presidential election despite
divergence from several of their respective parties’ historic platform planks. Such trends appear
upon initial inspection to indicate that voters’ perceptions of both their own party and the
opposing party are determined by cultural prejudices rather than nuanced or well-researched
investigation of their policy stances. Through selective media following and personal
interactions, voters filter out opinions that challenge their own. Viewing the opposing party
through the lens of one’s own biased media creates a picture of the opposition as being more
extreme than it actually is, driving voters to move further to the extreme end of their own party
in reaction. This selective exposure to information reinforces people’s preexisting views and
contributes in sorting the American people into two camps and driving them apart. The following
study suggests the hypothesis that Americans segregate themselves into cultural spheres that
protect and reinforce preconceived political views. This results in social homophily, a
phenomenon created by the closely related echo chamber effect.
Social Homophily
As social homophily remains the central theme of this paper, it will be important to start
by defining this term. The following pages will trace the development of social homophily and
current research on its role in American politics, and it will lay out where the present study is to
go from here.
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Arvidsson, Colleoni, and Rozza define homophily as “the tendency of similar individuals
to form ties with each other,” often as a result of cognitive dissonance and selective exposure
theories (2014, p. 318-319). Threatened with the pressure to reevaluate deeply held conceptions
and values, most people choose instead to avoid having their ideas challenged altogether.
Homophily creates a positive feedback loop; when people choose to associate with each other
based on a certain commonality, they begin conforming to each other to the point where most or
all of their views or lifestyle choices align with their peers’. Lilliana Mason’s 2014 study found
that partisan sorting increases both social and ideological polarization but that social polarization
grows at a faster rate (p. 139-141). This homophily is similar to what Carsey and Layman call
“conflict extension”: average voters follow party elites in aligning their views together along a
single liberal-conservative dimension. In other words, party identification determines ideology
(Carsey & Layman, 2002, p. 799-800).
Existing research indicates that the ideological sorting of the past fifty years is a major
contributing factor to the new social homophily. Bafumi and Shapiro write that the parties are
now divided along perfect ideological lines (2009, p. 17-22). Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus
observe that in a polarized environment, voters are more likely to derive their views from party
leaders than from logical arguments (2013, p. 74-76). This previous work would suggest that the
initial development of polarization created homophily, rather than the reverse.
The echo chamber effect, discussed more thoroughly in the next section, is demonstrated
to be another key contributor to social homophily. The availability of consumer media makes it
easy for people to choose the information sources that align best with their views and therefore
give them further affirmation.
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In addition to the personal dimension, Gerber, Henry, and Lubell observe homophily and
its impact on a regional scale. Noting that shared ideas facilitate communication, they
demonstrate that municipal governments that have more in common with each other maintain
closer contact with each other (Gerber, Henry, & Lubell, 2013, p. 608).
The expected impact of social homophily in a partisan political environment is
profoundly self-evident. When voters sort themselves based on party affiliation and allow this
sorting to then shape other aspects of their social lives, creating homogeneity within parties,
Americans begin to define themselves by their party identities. It becomes easy to see, then, why
the losing team from any given election would feel fundamentally threatened by their defeat.
Such stakes are expected to continue increasing as homophily continues to pull Americans in
more extreme directions.
In the following pages, this study will attempt to confirm the above hypothesis. In
addition to measuring the scope of extreme voters, it will also consider and attempt to account
for the elusive middle. Based on the observations shown above, the voices of party extremists are
louder than those of moderates, meaning that extremists not only drown out moderates, but they
also are much easier to observe. Moreover, it is clear that the new political and media
establishments are now weighted toward extremist voters, especially those segments of the
media that tilt rightward. Given this information, the author expects this study to show that
moderates in such a situation are either forced to take sides and become extreme, thus further
shrinking the middle, or simply ostracized from a political system that does not represent them.
The Echo Chamber Effect
This study will address the echo chamber effect’s impact on partisan politics in the
United States’ current polarized atmosphere. As such, it is important to begin by defining the
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echo chamber effect, by explaining its manifestation in the political arena, and by posing some
preliminary observations on how strongly it contributes to partisan polarization. The questions
postulated here will provide an important starting point for the further discussion to come.
According to Barbera, Bonneau, Jost, Nagler, and Tucker, the echo chamber effect occurs
when people selectively expose themselves only to information that affirms their preexisting
views, resulting in both “social extremism and political polarization” (2015, p. 1531). In regards
to politics, this would consequently create a situation where the most ideological voters are
drawn into a positive feedback loop, moving further and further to the extreme ends of the
political spectrum.
How exactly does the echo chamber effect manifest itself in politics? Much has been
written about its role in consumer media, particularly in the blogosphere and, more recently,
social media. A 2009 study found that comments left across a variety of popular blogs tend to
support any given blogger’s statements on a three-to-one ratio. This affirmation was even higher
on political blogs, where positive comments outnumber negative comments on a nearly five-toone ratio (Gilbert, Bergstrom, & Karahalios, 2009, p. 4-5). On Twitter, likewise, Barbera, et al.,
found that ideologically extreme voters were overrepresented in retweeting political posts and
that ideologically extreme sources were retweeted the most frequently during political
discussions. This formed a sharp contrast to nonpolitical issues such as sports, where sources
perceived as moderate were retweeted more often (Barbera, et al., 2015, p. 1535-1537). While
most studies of the echo chamber effect have focused on the internet and social media, there
have been studies of traditional media as well; Jamieson and Cappella wrote about how Fox
News and the Wall Street Journal have combined with talk radio to form a conservative echo
chamber (2010, p. 75-90).
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In addition to the platforms driving the current echo chamber, a background must be
established for the dimensions of its impact on American politics. Past studies have indicated an
asymmetry of effect as voters from different parties are observed sorting themselves differently.
Barbera’s study found that liberals were more likely to retweet sources from outside their own
ideology (2015, p. 1537). Arvidsson, Colleoni, and Rozza researched this in more detail when
they discovered that Democratic ideologues more closely associate with other members of their
own party on Twitter than Republican ideologues, whereas Republican party activists associate
more strongly with fellow Republicans than Democratic party activists (2014, p. 327).
The echo chamber effect, as seen above, is an important contributing factor to the overall
phenomenon of social homophily. Since social homophily refers to the tendency for people to
associate with those that share commonalities, echo chambers create forums that allow
homophily to develop. People looking for affirmation seek out the echo chamber, and the echo
chamber in return reinforces their prejudices, thus creating a cycle.
This study will build on past research to investigate the direction and scope of social
homophily’s impact on electoral coalitions. In addition to the overall electorate, it will attempt to
draw inferences regarding two particular groups: extreme voters and moderate voters. Because
the echo chamber effect is a major cause of social homophily, it remains critical to this
discussion. Based on current research, the echo chamber effect is expected to be seen exercising
the strongest and most observable effects on extreme voters as it pulls them further in extreme
directions. More profound, however, is the way the echo chamber effect impacts the relationship
between moderate and extreme voters. Does it make parties more extreme overall, and if so,
how? Does it cause moderate voters to lose interest in politics, as Levendusky suggested (2015,
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p. 96-97)? Does it pull moderates themselves in extreme directions, thus growing the number of
extremists and hollowing out the middle?
In continuing with this study, it is important to start by pointing out some observations
and raising several questions from the research cited above. Most studies involving the echo
chamber effect do so in regards to its work in traditional and alternative media. It should be taken
into consideration whether there are other possible spaces to form echo chambers, including
neighborhood sorting and social venues. Studying the way these spaces shape political dialogue
will contribute to the investigation of social homophily overall. The following pages will also
further analyze the conclusions drawn in previous studies. It is worth noting, for instance, that
Gilbert’s study on blog participation based its results on comments left on blogs, not on overall
traffic. Previous studies have also spent more time analyzing ideological voters. The intuition
behind this is evident, since these people leave a greater trail on social media to follow.
Nevertheless, the fact that moderate voters do not always share as much on social media does not
rule out their significance. Such elusive quantitative data will be taken into account in the pages
ahead.
Literature Review
In addition to the studies cited above, the author of this study rounded off the literature
review with an examination of the existing research collected in Daniel Hopkins’s and John
Sides’s seminal Political Polarization in American Politics (2015). An anthology of critical
essays on the growth, causes, and effects of polarization in the United States’ current political
environment, this collection is a valuable resource for the present research. These essays are
written from a variety of different viewpoints and backgrounds and cover political polarization
from a wide variety of angles. The book starts by defining the nature and depth of American
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political polarization, adding some pieces speculating on the causes of polarization. It continues
with a few essays comparing the US’s position with several legislatures abroad. The book
finishes with a survey on the future of American party polarization and what can be done about
it.
In the present discussion of social homophily’s effects on polarized voters, this book
gives several starting points in the data analysis and presents some competing causes of
polarization that should be accounted for among the current study’s control variables. Several of
its chapters are written in competition with each other—there are three separate perspectives on
the role of the media in polarization alone—ensuring a broad and comprehensive analysis of the
subject. This book also does an excellent job delineating and enumerating the proportion of
moderate to extreme voters. Given that these are the subjects of the thesis under consideration, it
is important to define these terms and begin the study with a clear view of its parameters.
Among particularly useful pieces in Hopkins’s and Sides’s book, the first is Nolan
McCarty’s “What We Know and Do Not Know About Our Polarized Politics.” In this piece,
McCarty demonstrates that the Republican Party has moved in a more extreme direction than the
Democratic Party over the last forty years and that parties have become more ideologically
defined, making political conflict one-dimensional (2015, p. 2-5). Boris Shor’s “How US State
Legislatures Are Polarized and Getting More Polarized” is helpful for similar reasons, as he
corroborates McCarty’s observations on the state level and investigates the geographic sources of
polarization (2015, p. 16-21). Likewise, Carsey and Layman write about how the two parties are
polarizing across multiple different issues, meaning that voters for either party tend to share (or
are expected to share) the same viewpoint across every political issue. Their position calls to
mind the echo chamber effect: Voters who identify with their party strongly on the issues that
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matter most will allow their party to shape them on other issues, a process Carsey and Layman
refer to as “conflict extension” (2015, p. 25). They further note that both activists and average
voters are moving in extreme directions (Carsey & Layman, 2015, p. 27-29).
Moving to another vein, David Broockman’s “Are Politicians and Activists Reliably
‘More Extreme’ Than Voters? A Skeptical Perspective” outlines the dimensions of polarization
(2015, p. 47-54). Broockman distinguishes between voters with extreme views on certain
positions who do not closely conform to a party versus voters who remain moderate on all issues
across the political spectrum. The number of people conforming to this category is slim. This ties
back into the common theme of social homophily as the current study investigates whether party
affiliation shapes voters’ more moderate viewpoints.
Of all the pieces in the book, the most important is Lilliana Mason’s “Party Polarization
Is Making Us More Prejudiced” (2015, p. 55-60). Here Mason drives at the heart of the current
issue as she writes about how party polarization drives social polarization and causes people to
sort themselves into groups based on their beliefs. This is a poignant illustration of the role of
homophily in politics today, and it introduces the point upon which this study will expound. Alan
Abramowitz further explores the social side of polarization as he discusses how diverging
experiences shape electoral coalitions along racial and religious lines in “How Race and Religion
Have Polarized American Voters” (2015, p. 80-87).
Finally, Matthew Levendusky’s “Are Fox and MSNBC Polarizing America?” should be
taken into account (2015, p. 95-99). In this piece, Levendusky not only asserts that consumer
media places voters in an echo chamber but that the resulting polarization causes the few
remaining moderates to become disinterested in politics. Levendusky is challenged by
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Arceneaux, who claims in “Why You Should Not Blame Polarization on the Partisan News” that
partisan media is a result of polarization, not a cause (2015, p. 100-104).
Hypotheses
Based on the existing literature and recent trends, then, this study postulates three specific
research questions:
1. Does social homophily cause people to make their party a part of their identity?
2. If partisanship is part of voters’ identity, does this identity make them feel existentially
threatened when their candidates lose elections?
3. Does party polarization cause moderates to choose sides, or does it disinterest them from
politics?
All these questions together will tie in to support the broader hypothesis that social
homophily polarizes Americans’ party preferences. Research will be conducted through the use
of comparative layered crosstabs. Conclusions will be drawn from making inferences on the
basis of correlations observed over an extended period of time. This author expects to see the
convergence over time of party identification and political views with a series of social
identifiers. For example, party identification and political views in 1986 might only be somewhat
related to attitudes on hunting, but now they are intricately linked. Finding such a result would
suggest that party identification and political views have some sort of link in determining
attitudes on these things and vice-versa.
The Study
This study began study with identification of a collection of index variables that tie
partisanship to nonpartisan social identifiers such as profession, group affiliation, and
demographic characteristics. If factors that are not partisan in and of themselves are
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demonstrated to correlate with partisanship over time, this will indicate the possibility that
people’s party identifications are based on a broader sense of identity that transcends political
ideology.
The dependent variables chosen for this study are:
1. Does the respondent (or spouse) hunt?
2. What region does the respondent live in?
3. Does the respondent live in an urban, suburban, or rural area?
4. Does the respondent consider himself or herself religiously fundamentalist?
5. Does the respondent speak a language besides English or Spanish?
6. What is the respondent’s occupational category, as defined in the 2010 United States
census code?
The independent variables used are party identification and political ideology. All data is
taken from the General Social Survey’s archive, containing survey questions from 1972 onward
(NORC). Tests are conducted with layered crosstabs, comparing the above-mentioned dependent
variables against partisanship and/or ideology across years for which data is available between
1972 and 2014.
The first test conducted was a comparison of ideology against partisanship.
Demonstrating the proportion of liberals, moderates, and conservatives relative to each party
would both allow for stronger inferences in using these variables against other factors and
provide more insight into the influence of voters from all three ideological leanings. This first
test used party as its independent variable and ideology as its dependent variable, controlling for
year (Figure 1).
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Trends seen in Figure 1 demonstrate the growing polarization between the parties, while
independents identify as more moderate than ever. Democrats have shifted from roughly 25%
conservative in 1972 to only 15% conservative in 2014, whereas conservatives have gone from a
plurality of Republicans in 1972 to almost two-thirds of party identifiers by the 2010s.
Moderates continue to command a significant presence in 2014, making up over 40% of
Democrats and almost a third of Republicans, with over 40% of voters overall remaining
moderate.
With the above data indicating that the parties have polarized without quite hollowing out
the middle yet, the study now turns to measures of how social homophily correlates with
partisanship. The first comparison links whether or not respondents hunt to their party
identification (Figure 2).
Peculiar results begin to emerge in the above chart. While the results for Republicans
who say yes remain consistently between 20% and 30%, the percentage of Democrats who
answer yes continuously moves downward in an almost straight line from 28% in 1977 to less
than 10% in 2014. A glance at the associated chi-square coefficients confirms the statistical
significance (Figure 3). In this table, the chi-square value first drops below the critical threshold
of .05 in 1987 and fluctuates between critical and non-critical ranges until 1994, from which
point forward it reaches near zero.
The next relationship studied is between partisanship and region (Figure 4). Again in this
case, data from both the chart and from the chi-square values (Figure 5) reveal a significant
change over the past forty-five years. Rather than straight polarization, the changes in partisan
makeup occurring across the country during this time appear to be more of a dealignment. In
2014, the most recent year data was collected, only the West South Central came back less than
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40% Democratic, and no other region was above 57% Democratic, meaning Democrats have
pluralities or bare majorities across most of the country. Polarization, then, does not appear to be
built along regional lines, at least not as regions are divided in the framework of this dataset.
The study next moves on to partisanship by urban and rural neighborhoods (see Figure
6). While results here do show a change over time, this change does not indicate increased
polarization, but seems instead to move away from it. While the charts begin in the 1970s with
urban, suburban, and rural neighborhoods all majority Democrat, all three areas have shifted
Republican by 2014, remaining only plurality Democrat. Rural areas exhibit a closer margin of
Democrats to Republicans in 2014, but no area can with the available data be exclusively
associated with a single party. Testing these areas for ideology indicates even less polarization
by municipality size, as all three types of areas identify as plurality moderate by 2014.
The next comparison is partisanship against the respondents’ claims to being religiously
fundamentalist (Figure 8). Once again, there is change here over time, but instead of
fundamentalists exclusively identifying with one party over another, they have moved from
being overwhelmingly Democratic to an equal ratio of Democrats to Republicans.
Next the research looks at respondents’ propensities for speaking other languages aside
from English and Spanish. Data on this subject is much less readily available, going only as far
back as 2000. While there is not much change, the data does consistently associate language and
partisanship, as Democrats have a 30% chance of speaking a language besides English and
Spanish, contrasted to Republicans’ 20% chance (Figure 10). Testing this the other way around,
we see that speakers of a language besides English or Spanish have a 50% chance of being
Democrat, contrasted with a 25% chance of being either independent or Republican (Figure 12).
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The final variable under investigation is respondent’s occupational category. To more
easily sort through the mounds of data available on the numerous professions listed in the United
States Census 2010 occupation codes, the author combined the data on the listed occupations to
create new variables based on the six occupation categories listed on the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics website (Bureau of Labor Statistics).1 From this new set of variables, the study
compares partisan shifts in different sectors across time (Figure 14). The chi-square coefficients
reveal that there is very significant activity happening throughout all years surveyed. The
direction of movement yields major shifts occurring across sectors. At the surveys’ beginning in
1972, white-collar jobs in the management and professional sectors represent a roughly even
split between Republican and Democrat. While management jobs remain in this category
consistently up through 2014, professional jobs quickly shift to tilt slightly Democratic. Massive
shifts occur among pink-collar and blue-collar jobs, which begin heavily Democratic (averaging
between 60% and 70% in the early surveys) and dealign by the 1990s to just under 50%
Democratic, simultaneously shifting to an average of 30% Republican. The final step is to
compare occupational categories against ideology to see if the results mirror the tests for
partisanship (Figure 16). Looking at results from the most recent years shows that a plurality of
management jobs remains conservative, suggesting a link between party and ideology. This
breaks down, though, looking at the other fields. Professional jobs are roughly evenly divided
between liberal, moderate, and conservative, while the other four fields are between 40% and
50% moderate. This would seem to suggest that surveyed voters’ partisanship may have been
influenced by factors other than mere political views.

1

The original dataset included one variable for service in the United States army. As this did not fit into any of the
six broader census categories, it was not used for the purposes of the present study.
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Conclusions

The most important changes and correlations seen in this study are the growing
correlations between hunting and partisanship, between language and partisanship, and between
profession and partisanship. The first test case gives a clear example of a non-partisan
recreational activity differentiated between voters of different parties. This may be evidence that
party differences are based along broader cultural differences. The second cultural shift indicated
that Democrats are more likely than Republicans to speak a language other than English or
Spanish. The cause of this cannot be determined from this study: It is unclear whether this is
because Democrats prefer globalism and worldly education over nationalism or whether the
foreign language speakers seen in the test are immigrants who vote for what they perceive to be a
more pro-immigrant party. It will benefit future studies to control for this possible spurious
relationship and to investigate the partisan leanings of both multilingual immigrants and
multilingual American-born natives. Finally, the third test yielded the widest and most
significant results. From a study of the relationship between career field and partisanship, it is
apparent that economic background is closely correlated to partisanship, especially along class
lines (white-collar versus pink-collar and blue-collar). The fact that these partisan shifts are not
mirrored by ideological shifts indicates that these respondents’ partisanship may be determined a
sense of identity that transcends policy viewpoints.
Despite the eye-opening results revealed in the above test, researchers must take into
consideration the more modest changes seen in the other three tests. The first test did show
partisanship by region shift over time, but not to the point where any given region swayed
overwhelmingly toward a single party. Such a result is not as likely to support the thesis that
social homophily drives partisanship because people from different parties continue to coexist in
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the same regions here. This result is mirrored and reinforced in the test of urban and rural
divides: Even here, party splits exist within types of municipalities rather than against them.
Finally, the test of religious fundamentalism indicated no connection between fundamentalism
and partisanship.
Was the main hypothesis supported? While it remains to future tests to verify causation,
the study can now draw inferences from the patterns observed here and answer the three test
questions. The first question ties directly into the results: Does social homophily cause people to
make their party a part of their identity? The fact that people choose hobbies (hunting, in this
case) along party lines lends credence to this suggestion. The test on occupation category also
appears to shed light here. Tests showed that partisanship is connected to profession and that this
connection is not mirrored by a correlation in ideology. This would suggest that people are
beginning more and more to make party a part of their identity. Moreover, because people who
work similar jobs may be assumed to share similar backgrounds and spend most of their time
with coworkers in similar fields, homophily almost certainly plays some role in this identity. As
respondents spend more time with people from similar backgrounds, their shared experiences
can be understood to reaffirm their own views. At the same time, this test did not indicate that
voters tend by-and-large to be segregated by neighborhood. It appears, then, that the echo
chamber is not completely sealed off. Turning to the third question, it cannot be directly
determined from the results given that voters necessarily feel threatened when their parties lose
elections. However, the fact that partisanship can now be tied to identity lends more credence to
this question, leaving it open for a future study. Finally, modest inferences can be made about the
impact of homophily on moderates and moderates’ current place in the political scheme as well.
As the test of party versus policy views indicated, there are still many voters who identify as
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moderates. However, because the results also indicated that partisanship may not be exclusively
chosen based on policy, it is possible that the traditional policy-based party lines are becoming
less relevant. In such a case, voters who may consider themselves moderate in regards to the
issues that formerly defined partisanship may actually hold stronger opinions on newer issues
that have yet to come to the forefront of our nation’s politics. Future studies will be better able to
confirm or deny this hypothesis both by analyzing how voters feel about certain key policy
issues, controlled for liberal-conservative identification, and by identifying which issues tend to
be most important to voters.
In regards to the original question of whether social homophily and the echo chamber
effect polarize politics to the extent that they cause voters on the extreme end of either party to
view each other as existential threats, this study can cautiously make the judgment that this
hypothesis was confirmed by the current study. Social homophily is definitely at work in the
modern political scene, although its manifestations appear limited at this point in the research.
By nature of how homophily works, some form of the echo chamber effect must be present as
well. While this study discouraged the idea that voters are entirely closed off to hearing differing
opinions, they certainly spend enough time with like-minded people to receive disproportionate
affirmation of their biases. Since partisanship is becoming linked to the patterns by which people
define their existence, it is intuitively reasonable to think that they would feel their identities
threatened by electoral loss. It will be the purview of future studies to expand upon this
hypothesis.
It is important to recognize the impact these survey results will have on the future of
American democracy. Traditional assumptions of voting patterns are based on the standard
model of political behavior which requires that voters choose politicians based on their policy
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positions. As demonstrated here, though, there is increasing evidence, both empirical and
anecdotal, that voters are willing to look past dissonant policy in exchange for candidates that
appeal to their sense of identity. Political scientists should keep an eye out in the future as
identity politics come to define American democracy, drowning out the discourse on policy, and
these identifiers foreshadow the possible emergence of a new American nationalism.
Recommendations for Further Research
Electoral politics in the United States has always been and will continue to be a rapidly
evolving field. In light of the most recent presidential election, there is not yet sufficient data to
conclusively determine the causes for this apparent anomaly or whether it signals a long-term
shift in American politics, but this thesis is an important introduction to that discussion. Political
researchers in the future will need to pay attention to patterns noted in this piece as they impact
future elections, and they will need to more closely track Americans’ choices of social and
recreational activities to better observe the link between these and partisanship.
Ways to expand upon this study in future research include conducting a more detailed
study of the impact of media on partisanship. While past studies have suggested a link between
social media and homophily, consumer media such as cable television, blogs, and social media
are sufficiently young that political scientists have not yet had the time or collected the data to
draw strong conclusions in this regard, and the dataset used for this study had very little
information on media consumption relative to partisanship in general.
As stated earlier, further research will also need to determine Americans’ positions on
policy issues relative to the political views they claim to have. Political scientists should also
begin asking more targeted questions to probe at Americans’ national identity and how it impacts
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their attitude toward politics. Expanded research in this subject area will help give social
scientists a better understanding of the impulses driving Americans’ reactions to electoral defeat.
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